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1 
Abstract 
 
The European economic crisis need not be considered as a problem that is sui generis. 
Drawing on literature from the political economy of development that centers on 
finance and on monetary policy, we show that the economic vulnerabilities and policy 
predicaments facing the European periphery share many similarities with problems 
encountered by middle-income developing countries. Three main concerns guide our 
discussion: the politics of credible commitment, the significance of state capacity for 
stabilizing credibility, and the challenges of maintaining democratic legitimacy during 
times of financial volatility. Our analysis of the dynamics of hard currency pegs and 
monetary unions draws on lessons from the classic Gold Standard and on more recent 
experiences of financial crises in emerging markets. We consider how these may 
apply to the Eurozone periphery, before drawing out some implications for the 
problems of core-periphery relationships in European Monetary Union. 
 
Key words: European periphery; financial crises; emerging markets; credibility of 
monetary commitments; state capacity 
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Introduction 
The papers in this Special Issue have considered various aspects of the 
development challenges faced by different regions of the European periphery in 
the context of the Global Financial Crisis. In this paper, we look at the dynamics 
of core and periphery from the perspective of monetary and exchange rate 
policy.  
The Eurozone was known from the outset to be considerably less than an 
optimal currency area, and the institutional design of European Monetary Union 
(EMU) was intentionally minimalist. Strong assumptions were made about the 
capacity of domestic political systems to respond to asymmetric shocks. The 
seeds of the Eurozone crisis were sown during the good times between the mid-
1990s and the mid-2000s. But this was not solely because of deficiencies in 
domestic policy management. Tǯ
sudden convergence on low interest rates and the glut of credit the followed 
were not fully appreciated at the time. Indeed, it is striking how unprepared 
European policy-makers were for what happened.  
That said, thǯlong-term achievements in terms of peace, democracy, and 
prosperity should never be taken for granted. The EU project has been an 
inspiring model of cooperation for other regions. Nonetheless, parochialism in 
whatever shape can be a hindrance to understanding (Sartori, 1970). This basic 
rule of good comparative research suggests that there may be much to be gained 
from bringing perspectives from the global peripheries to bear upon our current 
European predicaments. This paper argues that a better-informed comparative 
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and historical perspective could have better informed the architects of EMU of a 
broader range of potential hazards than they had actually envisaged. Imbalances 
between core and periphery have been enduring features of attempts to 
institutionalize financial relationships between countries in the past. The 
problems faced by EMU are not essentially different from those experienced by 
countries in many other regions of the world.  
This paper draws on a financially-based approach to conceptualizing core and 
periphery that invites us to reflect on historical experiences of hard currency 
pegs and monetary unions, particularly the Gold Standard. We also look at recent 
and contemporary struggles for currency stability in ǲemerging marketsǳ1. 
Moving away from Eurocentric preoccupations and extending the geographical 
scope of core-periphery dynamics can provide some rather unexpected insights. 
Peripheral countries encounter particular kinds of problems within a fixed 
exchange-rate regime that make them vulnerable to disproportionate upward 
swings in the good times and excessive wealth destruction when the inevitable 
downturn arrives. We consider three of these in turn; credible commitment, 
state capacity, and democratic legitimation. We first outline the theoretical and 
empirical implications of these themes in the light of historical and 
contemporary experiences. We follow this with some reflections on the 
                                                      
1
 ³(PHUJLQJPDUNHWV´OLNH³SHULSKHU\´VRPHWLPHVODFNVFODULW\%XWWKHFRQFHSWPD\XVHIXOO\OHWXV
draw upon an established literature on financial vulnerabilities and monetary dilemmas.       
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consequences for our understanding of the vulnerabilities of the Eurozone 
periphery, before concluding with some implications for our current European 
predicament.  
ǲǳǲǳǡ
terms of the scope and speed of allocating increased powers to the European 
institutions. We argue that this is too simple a way to frame the issues that are at 
stake. By widening our frame of reference we gain new perspectives on the 
dynamics of core and periphery in the Eurozone. 
1. Rethinking core and periphery in an ?emerging markets? perspective 
Despite its intuitive appeal, ideas about core and periphery in contemporary 
Europe remain under-theorized and empirically poorly substantiated. The 
inconvenient fact is that some countries are simply more ǲdevelopingǳ or ǲemergingǳ, both economically and institutionally, than previously assumed. 
According to Bordo and Flandreau, a key distinction between core and periphery 
is their respective levels of ǲfinancial maturityǳ, that is, their perceived 
creditworthiness (Bordo and Frandreau 2003: 461). Anna Schwartz 
distinguishes between ǲcapital-richǳ (core) and ǲcapital-poorǳ (periphery) 
countries (Schwartz 2003: 468). Kenneth Dyson in his tour de force on the 
history of debt in Europe argues that ǲthe distinction between rulers and states 
who are creditworthy and those who are not points to a key differentiator 
between European core and peripheryǳ (Dyson 2014: 159).  
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Core-periphery relations are ultimately about systemic interdependence, linked 
through a web of trade, financial and political relationships. Spatial metaphors 
and hierarchical analysis often feature: Cohen (1998), for example, refers to ǲcurrency pyramidsǳ, and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) distinguish between ǲcreditor clubsǳ and ǲregions of vulnerabilityǳ. International league tables of  ǲdefault virginsǳ and ǲserial defaultersǳ show a good deal of continuity (Reinhart 
and Rogoff 2009). European debtor-creditor patterns are rooted in deep 
historical processes that can be traced back to the rise and decline of European 
empires, and before them, to the fortunes of city-states. There are striking 
parallels between the ǲhistoric arc of defaultǳ across southern and eastern 
Europe and the distribution of credit risk during the Euro crisis. This pattern 
points to a configuration of states that ǲshared chronically weak state capacity, 
limited willingness to pay creditors, and periphery and super-periphery statusǳ 
(Dyson 2014: 144).  
And yet the inventory of ǲsaints and sinnersǳ, ǲredeemersǳ and ǲfallen angelsǳ is 
regularly reconfigured, sometimes in rather surprising ways. The cultural and 
geographical boundaries of peripherality are not as historically invariant as the 
path-dependent account outlined above might suggest. Creditworthiness, and by 
implication the boundary between core and periphery, is not only based on 
assessments of objective economic evidence, but is also shaped by socially 
constructed interpretation and evolving power structures (Dyson 2014: 58; 
Brazys and Hardiman 2015). At issue is the shifting capacity of states to generate 
and sustain credibility in world markets that are themselves in flux. For example, 
the financial reputation of coǲǳ
 
6 
as France, Finland and Austria, and most notably Germany, fluctuated 
considerably over the last two centuries. Then again, some conspicuous 
members of the historic arc of default, such as Portugal and Spain, avoided full-
scale sovereign defaults in the twentieth century through their sometimes 
dramatic experimentation with devaluation, inflation, and financial repression.2 
More recently, emerging-market dysfunctions disrupted the economies and 
politics not only of Spain and Greece, but of ostensibly well-functioning 
economies such as Ireland and Iceland. The concepts of core and periphery and 
their respective defining characteristics should be treated as (moving) variables 
rather than (fixed) constants. Intermediate categories and typologies, suitably 
interpreted, may offer further conceptual refinement, such as, for example, 
Wallersteinǯs (1974) classic idea of ǲsemi-peripheryǳ and Sokolǯs (2001) more 
recent notion of ǲsuper-peripheryǳ.  
How do countries come to gain credibility in financial markets? Firstly, they need 
to be able to make credible commitments to sustainable financial management; 
secondly, they need to have the domestic capacity to absorb shocks without 
rupturing their external commitments; and thirdly, they need to be able to do 
this without causing a political backlash that would undermine monetary and 
exchange rate commitments.   
                                                      
2 This development is an important part of the story in its own right, as these policy options are no 
longer possible within EMU. 
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a.  The challenge of sustaining credible commitments 
A short-cut to financial credibility that often appeals to periphery countries 
involves pegging their currencies to a strong and visible external anchor, or 
vincolo esterno Ȃ securing themselves to core countries with extra-strong ǲglueǳ 
to avoid exclusion from the benefits of modern forms of integration (Bordo and 
Flandreau, 2003: 418). Political motives are also relevant: governing elites can 
thereby tie domestic constituencies into the desired political economy path, 
biasing policy choices and ensuring the irreversibility of a given reform process 
(Dyson and Featherstone 1999).      
The case of the historical Gold Standard is relevant here (Eichengreen 2008; 
Acena and Reis 1999; Ogren and Oksendal 2011). Indeed, ǲfor students of the 
Gold Standard, it is striking how familiar the modern view sounds, if only we 
look at the record carefullyǳ (Bordo and Flandreau 2003: 432). While the Gold 
Standard was geared toward generating stability at the core, it also involved a 
great deal of ǲinstability at the peripheryǳ (Eichengreen 2008: 37-41): ǲthere was 
a core that followed the high road of more or less complete gold convertibility, 
and an infamous periphery that had trouble pegging but resented floatingǳ 
(Bordo and Flandreau 2003: 418, emphasis added). Peripheral economies had 
poorly-diversified productive profiles, weak fiscal capacity, and fragile financial 
systems. They were extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in the terms of trade 
and to destabilizing shifts in international monetary flows. Interestingly though, 
the ǲrules of the gameǳ of the Gold Standard were less heavily regulated and 
more flexibly enforced, especially in the periphery, than is often assumed (Ogren 
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and Oksendal 2012). But the periphery countries lacked the political and social 
resources that supported the system at the center.  
Economic historians have always distinguished between a European capitalist 
core and its many peripheries, the latter characterized by relative socio-
economic backwardness, a series of distinctive policy and institutional 
weaknesses, and latecomer status (Maddison 2001; Lains 2003; Eichengreen 
2007). Contemporary developing economies are often exposed to very similar 
asymmetries in managing capital flows and currency instabilities (Cardoso and 
Faletto 1968; Prebisch 1981; Dosman 2008). Financial crises have been a regular 
feature of so-called emerging markets in recent decades. Indeed, ǲemerging 
markets learned the truth about financial markets from their painful experiences 
in the 1980s and 1990sǳ (Wolf 2014: 321; see also Santiso 2003). ǲ
lobalization 
appears to mean surprisingly consistent things in the periphery, but radically 
opposite things in the coreǳ (Bordo and Flandreau 2003, p. 418). 
What then are the implications ǲǳ, drawing on our historically and 
comparatively informed reflections on the issue of sustaining credible 
commitments in financial markets? One of the besetting problems of periphery 
economies is the inability to borrow abroad in their own currency, and they may 
even struggle to raise domestic funds in local currency at long maturities. This 
original sin (Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999) is one of the intrinsic fragilities 
of emerging markets. In contrast, Switzerland and Luxembourg emerged as 
global financial hubs through many iterations of crisis in Europe, during which 
they built up a durable reputation for financial security, not to say secrecy. 
Redemption from ǲinǳ is a long and uphill struggle, beset by many 
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contingencies. Nations at the lower strata of the international finance league do 
not climb the ladder easily (Hausmann and Panizza 2003).  
A related key feature of emerging markets is a pervasive fear of floating (Calvo 
and Reinhart 2002). Governments in the periphery are often reluctant to let their 
currencies fluctuate because they lack credibility in foreign markets to sustain ǯ. This is to some extent rooted in ǲriginal sinǳ and the 
threat of huge currency mismatches (that is, external debt that is issued in hard 
currency, while national fiscal revenues are denominated in soft currency), 
which in turn may lead to fiscal crises, banking panics, and sovereign defaults. 
The reputational handicap and the potential currency mismatches (which are 
related phenomena) make fear of floating an enduring characteristic of emerging 
markets. This helps explain the attractiveness of hard pegs to governments 
lacking credibility. 
In the debt game, though, some countries are more equal than others. Many 
developing nations suffer from debt intolerance as the result of their financial 
history and evolving credit records. Periphery countries may experience 
financial duress once they reach debt levels that would look manageable by the 
standards of core countries. For example, Argentina defaulted in 2001 while 
broadly meeting the Maastricht criteria, as did Mexico in 1982 with a debt-to-
GDP ratio that was lower still. On the other hand, some advanced economies can 
afford to accumulate big debts without seriously compromising 
creditworthiness, notably Japan, but also Belgium and even Italy.  
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Debt intolerance is a syndrome associated with weak institutional structures and 
problematic political systems (Reinhart et al. 2003; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009: 
21). Yet what is considered a sustainable or unsustainable debt is a historically 
bounded, socially constructed phenomenon. Power relations involving core-
periphery dynamics are always a relevant consideration in building and 
sustaining credibility (Dyson 2014).  
b. The key role of state capacity 
Credible commitment and state capacity are mutually interdependent 
(Gourevitch 2008). Core countries tend to have a stronger political ability to 
mobilize fiscal and financial resources, and stronger and more robust means of 
coping with economic shocks. But they also have a hinterland of institutional and 
organizational resources to manage the good times, making it possible to absorb 
rapid growth into productive channels without fatally undermining fiscal or 
financial stability. Conversely, periphery countries are usually associated with 
weak fiscal and state capacity. The absence of effective institutional buffers to 
accommodate external shocks Ȃ both good and bad Ȃ is the Achilles heel of many 
emerging economies (Rodrik 1998b).  
Financial immaturity and weak state capacity are analytically distinct but 
empirically inter-related. Periphery status entails a mix of self-reinforcing 
economic vulnerabilities and political weaknesses. As Besley and Persson (2011) 
show, the political economy underpinnings of the core are strongly ǲclusteredǳ, 
prompting functionalist explanations in which characteristics are inferred from 
outcomes, and vice versa. For example, the USA and UK were seriously exposed 
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to the financial crisis, but their governments managed to steer a course out of the 
crisis in ways that would be well beyond the capacity of the periphery. Geithner 
was able to use ǲoverwhelmingǳ US financial and fiscal firepower to underpin 
commitment during the financial crisis (Geithner 2014). Similarly, the British 
government, supported by the Bank of England, was able respond decisively to 
the failure of Northern Rock (Darling 2011). Financial credibility in world 
markets is intertwined with an institutionally well-developed capacity for 
effective and well-coordinated policy response.        
A capacity for state activism is key to explaining the growth strategies involved 
in various ǲpathways from the peripheryǳ (Haggard 1990), and even more so 
when we consider the sustained growth trajectories of the so-called ǲdevelopmental statesǳ of East Asia (Evans 1995; Amsden 2001, Cingolani 2013; 
Rodrik 1994; Stiglitz 1996). State capacity Ȃ fiscal, productive, and 
administrative Ȃ is critical for ensuring a prudent and productive absorption of 
capital in the good times, as well as a buffer against negative shocks in the bad 
times.  
Periphery economies frequently face a serious challenge in managing large 
inflows of international capital. External indebtedness can be productive or 
unproductive (Dyson 2014), but ensuring that capital inflows are productively 
used is highly problematic. In the former case, resources are wisely invested to 
expand the productive and social capacity of the country. In the latter, credit is 
used to fund superfluous and unsustainable consumption patterns. States vary in 
their capacity to engage economic and social actors in a growth strategy based 
on ǲintensiveǳ higher-level skills and technological innovation, as opposed to an 
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ǲextensiveǳ approach that relies on increasing the volume of the same factors of 
production, particularly in the form of labor power (Eichengreen 2007). Recent 
scholarship has noted the vital role the state has played historically in the 
economic development of the currently most developed societies, linking 
financial and productive capacities (Chang 2002, 2008). Mazzucato and others 
have renewed intellectual inquiry into the activist role of the state in supporting 
leading sectors of technological innovation in the most advanced economies 
(Mazzucato 2013). Development literature is replete with instances of growth-
promoting policy experimentation outside conventional orthodoxies. For 
example, Chileǯapparently successful uses of capital controls generated some 
recent policy learning, not least within the IMF (Moschella 2015). A nuanced 
reading of theories of ǲperipheral developmentǳ (Prebisch 1981) would suggest 
that emerging economies, engaging with globalization within the constraints of 
existing power relations, must be able to design a policy mix to suit local 
conditions, needs, and social preferences (Cardoso 2009).  
 As we have noted, an external anchor provides an ǲexternal solutionǳ to 
problems of cooperation that are difficult to manage at a domestic level (Taylor 
1987; Della Paolera and Taylor 2001). But sustaining a domestic coalition of 
support behind this policy can be problematic. The preference structures of the 
key social and economic actors would need to change in order to internalize the 
behavioral constraints required by the anchor, which in turn would have to be 
supported by new institutional practices and stable policy commitments. These 
interdependencies or complementarities are not pre-given, and must be built up 
and sustained over the long haul. But their sustainability is only put to the test in 
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the throes of a crisis, and a storm in mid-ocean is, proverbially, no time for ship-
building.  
The implication of these reflections is that the institutional capacity to deal with 
financial market volatility is put to stronger tests in the periphery, yet 
institutional resilience tends to be more fragile than in the core, testing state 
capacity up to and even beyond breaking point. Emerging-market economies are 
frequently exposed to brutal reversals of international capital flows known as 
sudden stops. In periods of high international liquidity, money flows to the 
periphery of the global economy where high returns are available. These 
financial flows can reverse rapidly in the face of negative economic shocks and 
swings in investorsǯ mood. The emerging-market gamble often creates massive 
opportunities for the emerging economies. But it also exposes them to the 
vulnerabilities associated with ǲcasino capitalismǳ, the high-risk stakes of the 
gambler rather than the steady investment and wealth accumulation of the 
stable bourgeoisie. The ǲanimal spiritsǳ released in speculative frenzies are 
notoriously hard to control. Allocating borrowed resources prudently and 
productively is extremely challenging, and requires a deep and mature 
infrastructure linking financial and productive functions. A sudden drying-up of 
funding sources exposes all these vulnerabilities in peripheral economies, with 
no place left to hide. 
The literature on sudden stops gained traction following the Mexican and 
Argentine defaults, and especially perhaps after the East Asian and Russian 
crises in the late 1990s (Calvo 1998). In good times, core markets are saturated 
and do not offer high-enough returns; hot money flies to successful periphery 
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countries, including the ǲmiracleǳ nations of the time, ǲto cash in where growth is 
today, and for the foreseeable futureǳ (Rapoza 2011). Capital inflows induce 
Dutch disease and even ǲresource curseǳ. Highly leveraged debt induces a 
financial version of the ǲparadox of plentyǳ (Ross 1999). But then in the all-too 
predictable bad times, capital ǲ to qualityǳ regardless of the fundamentals in 
the periphery. Periphery countries typically lack sound institutional buffers and 
are left exposed. This cycle is not only financial, but pervades the entire political 
economy: indeed, the major problem in developing countries is not lack of 
growth in good times, but the amount of ǲgrowth destructionǳ during crises 
(North et al 2009).  
Peripheral economies are also structurally exposed to the export of movable 
capital by domestic elites, and this can exacerbate the effects of sudden stops. 
The ready exit option favors core countries with well-established financial 
centers: think of wealthy ǯǡ
European assets held in Cyprus or in London. As Hirschman notes (2013), 
differential patterns of capital flight among core and periphery countries may 
raise not only economic but also political challenges. The formation of pro-
capitalist coalitions and free market ideologies in peripheral states is even more 
problematic when capital flight is the preferred and easy choice by local elites.3     
                                                      
3
 Similar problems arise in relation to other exit strategies such as emigration.  
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The accumulation of these vulnerabilities means that financial immaturity, or the 
lack of financial depth, is one of the structural features of developing and 
emerging countries; it is both a cause and effect of these processes. Financial 
immaturity can be thought as a cluster concept combining a range of emerging-
market characteristics (Bordo and Flandreau 2003). Securing financial maturity 
is a slow-moving, path-dependent process that may take a very long time. By 
extension, graduating from crisis also takes time (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). 
Climbing the international financial ladder involves ups and downs, false starts, 
and even reversals. The very volatility of emerging markets may even create the 
illusion of graduation, and the list of failed erstwhile ǲeconomic miraclesǳ is ever-
growing. But confidence, in the end, is fickle, and confidence games in emerging 
markets are truly contentious (Santiso 2003). Periphery countries are vulnerable 
to self-fulfilling crises. Indeed, the possibility is exacerbated by the possibility of  
multiple equilibria in potential outcomes, in which both debt sustainability and 
sovereign default are both perfectly possible outcomes, quite independently of 
the underlying macroeconomic fundamentals. Lack of state capacity reinforces 
the challenges of credible commitment.  
c. Technocratic policy in tension with democratic legitimation  
Political commitment to democratically legitimated decision-making in the 
periphery can be severely tested in a world in which financial, monetary, and 
fiscal policy options are constrained. Where regional reputation or neighboring 
states present negative externalities (that is, compromise investor confidence in 
other economies the region), governments may need to signal credibility by 
going overboard on their own policy commitments (Rodrik 1998a). During the 
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1990s, for example, Portugal successfully boosted its market credibility from a 
low starting point by introducing stringent fiscal measures; similarly, Argentina 
managed to decouple itself from the poor market ratings of Mexico through 
strong domestic disciplines. But over-commitment and over-adjustment also 
come at price, involving political costs in the short-term and leading to economic 
imbalances in the long run.  
Successfully implemented external anchors may themselves unleash unpleasant 
unintended consequences, activating a perverse political economy cycle. As we 
have noted above, the adoption of a successful monetary commitment can open 
sizeable financial opportunities, leading to paradox-of-plenty effects that are 
hard to control. The avalanche of easy money, if not properly managed, distorts 
public finances and biases the growth model, compromising sustainability. But 
the effects are not confined to the economic domain. They spill over into the 
politico-administrative system itself: monetary abundance corrupts the political 
system, undermining good governance. The circle of adverse consequences is 
then closed, often following a sudden credit crunch, with an ǲinstitutional 
cascadeǳ of dysfunctionality, however originally well-conceived the original 
institutional configuration may have been. Commitment to the external anchor 
may well be quickly abandoned, or more likely may collapse, in the face of 
insurmountable economic imbalances and intensifying domestic political 
resistance. This vicious sequence has haunted many emerging countries, not 
least Argentina around the turn of the millennium (Della Paolera and Taylor, 
2001; Dellepiane-Avellaneda, 2005).  
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Looking further back, the Gold Standard was also vulnerable to the increasing 
politicization of the policy process in the periphery. But ultimately, the political 
base of the Gold Standard also crumbled at the core, under pressure from 
popular mobilization against the distributive consequences of policy choices that 
were made in order to stick to the targets (Polanyi 1944/2001). If anything, we 
would expect questions regarding the democratic viability of external 
commitments, in both core and periphery countries, to be even more pressing 
today (Rodrik 2012). 
From the Gold Standard to the current phase of globalization, then, the politics of 
monetary commitments poses serious challenges to the periphery. The mode of 
insertion of sovereign nations into the international monetary system, and the 
terms on which they are able to do this, are not symmetrical for core and 
periphery countries. While developed countries with a good reputation have 
been able to manage a flexible exchange rate, fear of floating has been more 
pervasive in the periphery (Bordo and Flandreau 2003: 432). And yet emerging 
markets that use a vincolo externo to get to the high road of international finance 
often find themselves ǲstraining at the anchorǳ because of the domestic 
discontent generated by the policy itself (Della Paolera and Taylor 2001).  
Monetary anchors, after all, are ultimately political anchors, and the solution to 
monetary dilemmas involves further political dilemmas. Sustaining external 
commitments in the context of democratic representation and territorially-
defined political accountability can become highly problematic. Economies 
lacking control over exchange rates must manage adjustment through flexibility 
in relative costs (including wages), or in the level of economic activity (including 
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employment levels), with implications for the well-being of those most exposed 
to market fluctuations (which may include producer as well as employee 
interests). The interests of the exposed sectors tend to run directly counter to 
those of owners of assets and resources (land, capital, savings) who benefit from 
maintaining the external anchor. The implications for distributive conflict and 
social antagonisms are obvious. As we have noted, periphery countries often 
have a limited institutional capacity to support effective growth-promoting 
policy; they typically also lack sufficient social compensation measures to build 
and sustain broad-ǲǳ over the long term (Etchemendy, 
2011). In this context, political contention and social unrest is all too predictable 
a consequence of a hard-currency policy.  
3. The European periphery as emerging market economies?  
These reflections suggest that an emerging-marketization of the European 
periphery shaped the pathways to crisis and constrained the range of policy 
options available during the Great Recession. ǡǲȋIn the Eurozone 
periphery), the flows reversed at the first sign of trouble, as one would expect of 
capital flows to emerging economiesǳ (Wolf 2014: 214).  
The crisis-prone countries of the Eurozone are more closely aligned with the 
developed world than with any global periphery experiences: we do not wish to 
stretch the concepts unduly (Sartori 1970). Moreover, within the Eurozone 
periphery there is considerable variation in the structural features of their 
political economy, the dynamics of their adaptation to EMU, and the challenges 
and prospects they face in accommodating to the new post-crisis order. But our 
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more expansive periphery perspective may nonetheless shed some new light on 
the broader dynamics of the Eurozone core and periphery, since earlier 
aspirations toward convergence have been so thoroughly disappointed. 
a. The volatility of financial flows and the paradoxes of credible commitment  
The ever-present challenge of credible commitment is at the heart of the political 
economy of the European periphery. The motivation of these countries for 
joining EMU stems directly from the classic problem of managing a weak 
currency in a floating regime, or even semi-floating, as in the case of EMS. Indeed 
European governing elites faced these dilemmas from the outset, particularly ǲǳ(Barry 2003). From the 
Werner Report of 1970 to the current critical juncture, the challenge has been 
one of developing a sound institutional framework to ensure monetary 
cooperation in the ever-ǲbrave new monetary worldǳ (Eichengreen 
2008).  
According to Bordo and Flandreau (2003: 420), ǲthe meaning of financial 
globalization varies a lot depending on the type of country Ȃ core (advanced) or 
periphery (emerging) Ȃ and the type of regime (floating, fixed) we considerǳ. 
EMU emerged from quite divergent motivations and expectations (Sandholtz 
1993; Dyson and Featherstone 1999). Economists noted the non-optimality of 
this currency area from the outset, but the political drive was led by leaders of 
core countries who were committed to the belief that this radical move would 
eventually strengthen convergence in the ǲrealǳ economies of the weaker 
member states (Marsh 2011). Periphery countries had a strong economic 
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motivation to tie themselves to an external anchor that was guaranteed by the 
credibility of the DM. The full implications of these contrasting incentives and 
expectations for the viability of the Euro were initially overlooked by most 
(though McKay 1999 was a notable exception). 
Some incentive problems associated with the paradox of pre-commitment were 
also neglected. Credibility strategies are bound to mean different things for core 
and periphery countries, precisely because they are providers and buyers of 
reputation respectively (Dellepiane-Avellaneda 2005, 2013). In the periphery, 
governments tend to overestimate the short-term payoffs of ǲtying oneǯhandsǳ, 
and to underestimate the longer-run risks. The question of what would happen if 
the gamble went wrong was hardly considered. Greeceǯproblems with 
maintaining its credibility on international markets were the most extreme in 
the Eurozone, but they are only the furthest point on a continuum on which the 
other periphery countries also found themselves (Dellepiane-Avellaneda 2015).   
Political conditionality imposed from outside did indeed support domestic 
internalization of the Maastricht disciplines (Franco 1998). But what followed 
disrupted its long-term institutitonalization, in ways that now look quite 
predictable in the light of historical and comparative experiences. The periphery 
suddenly gained credibility in the international markets that it had not earned 
for itself, and this ǲborrowed credibilityǳ gave it access to a superfluity of cheap 
credit. The surge of speculative capital to less-developed areas where the returns 
on investment were high was all but irresistible, generating classic speculative 
bubbles built on both private credit and (especially in the case of Greece) public 
borrowing. 
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The myth that the crash in the Eurozone was occasioned by excessive fiscal debt 
has been widely discredited. The growing consensus view is that this was first 
and foremost a financial crisis, and only later did the ensuing banking crisis turn 
into a sovereign debt crisis (Baldwin and Giavazzi 2015). Fiscal crisis did not 
cause the credit crisis, but followed it as revenues collapsed and deficits rose. 
The crash was an absolutely classic instance of ǲsudden stopǳ (Merler and Pisani-
Ferry 2012). What ensued was an equally classic ǲflight to qualityǳ, as capital re-
migrated to the safe havens of the core.  
This was not supposed to happen. The institutional design and policy 
commitments of EMU explicitly ruled out the possibility of financial crisis. The 
repudiation of the very possibility of sovereign defaults, a constant feature of 
emerging markets, is an obvious case in point. The potential implications of 
sudden stops were also ignored. Intra-EMU current account imbalances were 
also supposed to be inconsequential. Policymaking elites across Europe 
internalized this thinking. The official narrative was that the Eurozone would not 
be undermined by the asymmetries and vulnerabilities common to center-
periphery relations and familiar from the experiences of other regions and other 
times.  
ǲOriginal sinǳ syndrome has now become a persistent issue within EMU. The 
latent fragmentation of the Eurozone is reflected in interest-rate differentials 
between core and periphery countries, and in the fact that some Euro deposits 
are more equal than others (Cyprus being the most dramatic case). This has 
tested the idea of a single currency severely. The boom years had only created 
the illusion of ǲfinancial graduationǳ.  
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But nothing, let alone a monetary commitment, is actually irreversible in the 
world of sovereign states (Cohen 1998). In the earlier good times, the possibility 
of countries reverting to their original currencies was supposed to be minimal 
but the desire to do so arguably negligible anyway. Yet the unthinkable has a 
nasty habit of emerging into view in hard times. Regardless of formal 
arrangements and politiciansǯ repeated commitments to the rules of the game, 
markets started betting on an institutional reversal, unmasking in the process 
the hitherto hidden boundaries between core and periphery.  
It is evident in hindsight that claims about the exceptional nature of monetary 
integration in Europe were overstated.4 As always, this time was not so different. 
Emerging-market dynamics played out all too familiarly in the now rediscovered 
European periphery.  
b. Institutional capacity at national and European levels 
Without strong and resilient institutional capacities, we have noted that 
peripheral nations are vulnerable to extreme financial volatility, with paradox-
of-plenty diseases in good times and painful growth-destruction in hard times. 
The surge of capital to the Eurozone periphery during the boom years of the 
2000s caused precisely the kind of paradox of plenty that is so hard to manage in 
                                                      
4
 Dyson (2014) argues that international organizations such as the IMF have incentives to downplay 
the perceived weaknesses of advanced countries, and recent IMF soul-searching appears to endorse this 
(IMF Independent Evaluation Office 2016). 
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countries with weak institutional capacity. State capacity is key for 
understanding not only how countries buffer negative economic shocks, but also 
how they absorb positive ones. 
This is evident in three institutional arenas: productive investment and resource 
allocation, politico-administrative systems, and macroeconomic stabilization. We 
see these effects playing out in the Eurozone periphery along readily 
comprehensible lines. Firstly, the reason why these countries are peripheral in 
the first place is because they have limited access to capital and weakly 
developed abilities to direct investments into productive areas. It was all too 
easy for a new flood of cheap money to be misallocated to non-productive assets 
such as construction or consumption goods. Since this appeared to create 
nominal wealth and to raise living standards quickly and at little visible cost, it 
was supported by strong coalitions of interest across the society and was 
politically hard to resist. The direction and size of capital flows in the Eurozone 
resembled all too closely the patterns observed in volatile emerging markets: in 
Ireland and Spain, in the Baltic nations and Slovenia, and indeed in Iceland 
(outside the Eurozone), hot money inundated the periphery, inducing Dutch 
disease and even resource curse.  
Secondly, the boom in turn degraded those institutional resources that do 
function reasonably stably, slackening vigilance over risk-taking, and opening 
the doors to the emergence of new political constellations of rentiers with a 
vested interest in keeping the taps flowing such as banks, developers, builders. 
Corruption scandals in Spain, for example, cannot be understood without 
considering the governance effects of easy money.  
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Thirdly, the challenges of macroeconomic management overwhelmed the 
institutional resources available to policy actors, whether in the form of fiscal 
policy or labor market policy. Sudden capital inflows gave rise to large balance of 
payments imbalances with the core and with the rest of the world. Domestic 
inflationary pressures were imported through just such massive over-heating. In 
the context of average low inflation across the Eurozone, the inflation differential 
resulted in extremely low and even negative interest rates in the periphery in the 
first half of the 2000s, further intensifying the incentives for capital surges to the 
periphery and extensive borrowing on domestic markets. Rising inflation and 
increasingly unaffordable house prices strained the capacity of wage-setting 
systems (Johnston and Regan 2017). The view that consumption and thus 
demand could be dampened through fiscal interventions simply lacked 
credibility. Periphery governments that had not previously run large fiscal 
surpluses could not readily introduce counter-measures of sufficient magnitude 
(Scharpf 2011). 
Of course country experiences varied. Membership of EMU did indeed shelter its 
periphery members against the full blast of financial failure, unlike Argentina or 
Iceland (Dellepiane-Avellaneda 2015; Boyes 2010). European institutional 
capacity insulated periphery countries from ǲdebt-intoleranceǳ effects. 
Notwithstanding the rhetoric of ǲno bailoutǳ, crisis interventions were mobilized, 
followed by moves to establish permanent support facilities. Ireland, for 
example, took on new debt equivalent to about 100% of GDP to recapitalize the 
banks and keep the government afloat, and despite suffering the worst economic 
collapse in the stateǯhistory (and one of the worse financial crises ever), was 
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not expelled to the class of ǲdebt sinnersǳ in the global economy. Periphery 
countries could afford to run deficits and to accumulate debts that would be 
unthinkable in the outer peripheries. Without these buffers, however hastily 
constructed, the financial systems and hence the economies of the weakest 
members of the Eurozone would have imploded à la Argentina.  
However, the shelter afforded by EMU came at a considerable price and with a 
decidedly leaky roof that left some parts of the suffering periphery a good deal 
more exposed than others. The reason for this is, of course, the ǲunfinished 
architectureǳ of Europeǯeconomic union (Schmidt 2010). EMU intentionally 
lacked the policy instruments appropriate to a currency union such as fiscal 
transfers to compensate for asymmetric shocks, a banking union to manage 
insolvent banks, or even a common financial regulation framework to control 
risk and monitor lending practices. It had relied all too confidently on fiscal rules 
whose malleability had already been demonstrated in 2003 and 2004, and which 
were in any case quite irrelevant to the roots of the crisis in trade and financial 
imbalances. But in addition, deficits in institutional capacity were matched by a 
dearth of political capacity among the European elites even to devise credible 
and sustainable policy solutions or to implement them decisively. Minimal 
measures to meet immediate crises, while postponing hard decisions by ǲkicking 
the can down the roadǳ, notoriously became the leitmotif of the EU approach to 
crisis management.  
Unable to do what was necessarily to deal decisively with the crisis, the EU, like 
the proverbial drunkard looking for his lost keys under the streetlight because 
that was where he could see, turned all the more enthusiastically toward what it 
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was able to do Ȃ that is, intensify the rules governing fiscal policy. Monetary 
anchors have often ended up being overwhelmed by policy inconsistencies 
(Sandholtz1993; Dyson and Featherstone 1999) and the Euro, it turned out, was 
no different. The Delors Report had noted that the monetary policies of EMS 
member states were ǲoverburdenedǳ by a lack of fiscal coordination and by 
country-specific institutional diversity. EMU fiscal rules were meant to control 
this problem. But the rules themselves were then obliged to bear most of the 
systemǯcredibility. Institutionalized conditionality proved to be most 
problematic precisely in the area of fiscal policy (Blavoukos and Pagoulatos, 
2008; Hallerberg et al. 2009).  
A widespread consensus among professional economists counseled against 
matching private-sector recession with public sector austerity. But this was 
precisely what European policy-makers did while trying to secure better 
controls over national fiscal discretion. A wave of new rule-making, and the ex 
ante and ex post monitoring consequent upon the European Semester, the Two-
Pack, the Six-Pack, and the Fiscal Compact, strengthened the systemic 
deflationary bias to the system. The ǲone size fits allǳ fiscal framework prevents 
counter-cyclical intervention in response to fluctuations in the economic cycle. 
Yet flux is more common in the periphery in the core, and the in-built 
deflationary bias is pro-cyclical in recessionary conditions. Deficit-hawk 
priorities in EU official circles are damaging to the periphery, but congruent with 
what German-inflected ordoliberalism. The triumph of one ideational framework 
over others can be due to many factors, but the approach proposed here prompts 
us to be alert to manifestations of geographical and political differentials in 
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power relations between core and periphery. Economic geography still matters 
in unexpected ways (Krugman 1998). 
c. Democratic legitimation in EMU 
The inherent tension between international capital mobility and democracy was 
meant to be resolved within the EMU by precluding the possibility of floating 
(Eichengreen 2008: 232). The competing claims of market efficiency, social 
cohesion and political legitimacy would now need to be managed within the 
existing rules of the game. In the context of perceived prohibitive exit costs, 
countries would be tied to the mast of Maastricht.  
But institutional solutions to credible commitment are subject to credibility 
problems (Bardhan 2005), and these in turn are only possible in democracies 
when political support can be sustained. Institutional design needs to be backed 
up by supportive economic and social coalitions. In many emerging countries, 
the domestic constituency supporting monetary and fiscal stability is structurally 
small. This is precisely why these countries may ǲneedǳ a disciplining external 
agency in the first place. The tension is not easily resolved after the self-binding 
has taken place, resulting in endless struggle of ǲrules versus menǳ (Kindleberger 
1999). This tension between technocratic governance and democratic 
deliberation is key to understanding Europeǯcurrent woes and indeed the 
future of the Euro project (Sandbu 2015).   
The crisis brutally exposed the fudges that lay behind this balancing-act ȋǯe 2011). There are compelling reasons why a decisive shift to some 
form of federal policy capacity would be desirable to solve the coordination 
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problems that have emerged. But there is evidently little appetite for far-
reaching transnational consolidation of the locus of power. To the contrary, there 
are signs of a growing trend toward retreat inside national borders in a manner 
that would endanger the economic and political gains of coordination and 
cooperation. Brexit is the most advanced and dramatic instance of this; right-
wing populist and far-right nationalist forces gather momentum elsewhere 
across Europe around similar though equally ill-ǲǳǡǤWhile anti-system 
challenges gather pace in the core, the crisis-hit periphery has suffered 
fragmentation of their party systems (Hardiman et al 2017). All of this must be 
the subject of extreme concern to defenders of the European project. 
4. Implications for the political economy of European integration 
The crisis exposed a whole range of unresolved issues in the political economy of 
the Eurozone. Some countries of the European periphery, we find, are more ǲemerging, both economically and politically, than previously assumedǳ. In a 
world of globalized finance, even ǲthe old core is becoming more peripheralǳ 
(Wolf 2014: 16).  
Contemporary debates about possible ways forward in the wake of the Global 
Financial Crisis are often framed in ǲǳǲǳ. As Bruszt and Vukov note in the Introduction to this Special Issue, 
either option is highly problematic. ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ
global governance, the options are not merely about degree of engagement with ǲǳǡ
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accountability and political federalism in the context of deep economic 
integration.  
The three broad themes that have guided our reflections suggest that the current 
malaise of EU politics may usefully be analysed in terms that open out the debate 
further, so we can at least understand what is at stake.  
The first concerns the politics of credible commitment. A better understanding of 
the credibility dilemmas underpinning monetary institutions may shed new light 
on the institutional sources of the Euro crisis and help clarify debates about the 
reform of European institutions. Like Mauro (2011), we can no longer assume 
that painful financial crises accompanied by political instability are the domain 
of developing countries. ǲSystems are tested on their marginsǳ (Bordo and 
Flandreau 2003: 418). Those countries that graduated from bailouts (Ireland, 
Portugal, Spain) face new problems of rebuilding their credibility; but the 
eruption of crisis in Cyprus and worries about Italian banks, as well as the 
unending travails of Greece, show that vulnerabilities are never far from the 
surface.  
The on-again, off-again possibility of a forced or a voluntary ǲGrexitǳ in recent 
years shows forcefully that EU policy elites may be willing to view EMU as a 
currency union rather than as a device for full monetary integration. This 
indicates that a fuller appreciation of both the merits and the limits of the vincolo 
esterno is necessary. These matters should not be subject merely to the 
pragmatic calculations or ad hoc accommodations of a particular moment. In this 
context, the doubling-down on centralized fiscal discipline looks highly 
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problematic. Budget constraints in a monetary union need to be credible; but 
hard surveillance breeds resentment and is the antithesis of domestic 
internalization of sustainable targets. It is not self-evident that tying countries 
more firmly to the mast of fiscal and other performance targets will produce 
more stability: rules have already proven to need periodic though ad hoc ǡǲǳȋ	 ? ? ? ?ǣ
p.49). Credible commitment needs to be built in ways that permit some domestic 
flexibility. What is required then is ǲǳǡǡǲǳ
ties (Blanchard et al, 2016). Sometimes, it seems, more institutional flexibility is 
needed precisely in order to sustain the same level of policy performance 
(Mahoney and Thelen 2010, Thelen, 2014). 
Furthermore, the ǲone size fits allǳ approach to recovery privileges countries that 
can generate growth through export performance. Strong budgetary and wage 
disciplines to increase the relative advantage of internationally traded goods and 
services can support a feasible recovery strategy. This suits Germany admirably. 
Ireland, through its cultivation of US investment, has also found that it can build 
a path to recovery along these lines. But this is just one potential ǲrecipeǳ for 
dealing with the insertion of an economy into global markets, and a limited one 
at that (Rodrik 20120). For if there are exporters, there must be importers, so 
the unilateral quest for relative advantage must result in a beggar my neighbor 
outcome from a Europe-wide perspective. Moreover, competitiveness-centered, 
trade-based adjustment is spectacularly lopsided at a European level. Germanyǯ
trade balances run well over the 6% EU Macroeconomic Scoreboard guidelines, 
while the weaker economies have deficits much worse than the 4% indicated 
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(already an asymmetrical target). All of this would seem to point toward the 
need for better macro-economic policy coordination at the European level. But 
perhaps this may not come about until German policy-makers Ȃ and voters Ȃ face 
up to the unsustainability of a growth model that constrains domestic 
investment and consumption so dramatically. 
The second area that invites further research is the closely related issue of state 
capacity Ȃ not just the institutional design of EMU itself, which has attracted 
some attention in recent times, but the political and administrative capacity for 
strategic action at both EU and at national level. The crisis exposed the poor 
capacity of peripheral countries to buffer negative shocks. Perhaps more 
critically, institutional coordinating capacities proved to be inadequate in good 
times too, at both EU and national levels. It seems that institutional fragilities are 
stubbornly persistent even in the face of economic catch-up. The long-term 
challenge of building policy and administrative capacity was forcibly brought 
home to European policy-makers in the context of their efforts to ensure Greek 
compliance with the terms of loan agreements, but as yet with little clear sense 
of how to address this systematically (Featherstone 2016). 
A historical and comparative perspective exposes the continuing gap between 
the economics and the politics of European integration. An emphasis on market-
deepening, backed by fiscal discipline and structural adjustment, makes it ǲǳǤ
strengthening national-level adaptation of institutions and practices takes time, 
but it may also require more adaptive latitude than current policy framework 
permits. ǲǳa better strategy, we might also 
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suggest that the public finances might be permitted to be deployed more flexibly 
for investment and development purposes: European institutional capacity 
might be drawn on to guide rather than control national frameworks of capital 
formation. Fabbrini ȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ? ?Ȍǯ EU-led investment 
plans may have some potential for growth by inducing a private sector multiplier 
effect. This would be powerfully boosted by a recalibration of what is considered 
on or off the public balance-sheet to enable better-quality productivity-
enhancing public investment. 
Some further implications for the growth prospects of the periphery emerge as 
we broaden our range of vision beyond Europe. The IMF has, it seems, come to 
see that Europe is no different from developing countries in needing significant 
debt restructuring, especially in Greece (IMF 2016). The need to develop 
sufficiently flexible but sufficiently powerful transnational mechanisms to tame 
financial excesses and promote growth prospects is clearly pressing (Rajan 
2010). EU investment vehicles are small, limited, constrained Ȃ at nothing like 
the scale that would be required by a systematic development strategy. But this 
does not at all eclipse the need to build state capacity at national level, not just to 
manage adjustment to externally set objectives, but to devise policy choices, 
appropriate to the conditions of their own economy, that would enable a 
sustainable ǲpathway from the peripheryǳ. 
EU member states, and a fortiori Eurozone members, have progressively 
accepted a narrowing of policy options for their domestic polities. The emerging-
economies literature shows that the arsenal of national-level state strategies to 
support development diverse. Most of the policy options associated with the 
 
33 
ǲǳ precluded by the rules of the Single 
Market or of EMU. But there is no reason why new institutional capacities to 
support imaginative policy solutions could not be devised in the distinctive 
framework of multi-level European governance.  
The challenge is one of sustaining externally-anchored pathways from the 
periphery while permitting the scope for diversity in domestic democratic 
preferences that is the basis of ongoing system stability. Added to this is the 
importance of allowing policy scope to build sustainable coalitions of support ǡǲǳǡ. The 
experiences of both the Gold Standard and of emerging economies caught in 
global core-periphery dynamics forcibly underline the political costs of pursuing 
a technocratic economic management policy that is divorced from, and even at 
odds with, a broad spread of popular preferences.  
On the other hand, institutional innovation and policy entrepreneurship in 
response to crisis have in fact been in evidence in the EU in different institutional 
arenas. Without Draghiǯǲwhatever it takesǳ intervention, first in 2012, then 
with the loosening of monetary policy to counteract tight fiscal measures, the 
EMU may well have disintegrated by now. But European policy-makers face 
structural challenges in transcending the trade-offs inherent in 
intergovernmental bargaining in order to develop policy measures appropriate 
to system-wide problems. This is what makes it so difficult to devise and 
implement macroeconomic policy with a Europe-wide frame of reference (Jones 
et al 2016). Without an active political commitment to explaining to national 
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voters the rationale for Ȃ and tangible benefits from Ȃ proposed moves toward 
European coordination, there will be no durable capacity-building at European 
level. 
This brings us to the third theme we have highlighted, that of maintaining 
democratic legitimacy in the context of a non-accommodating monetary regime 
and with limited scope for fiscal compensation. There is evidence of a good deal 
of commonality in policy preferences across Europe as a whole (Hale et al, 2016). 
Habermas is among the most forcible in arguing for a push toward building 
stronger state and political capacity at European level. Our analysis suggests that 
domestic legitimation is a variable commodity. The Eurozone periphery 
countries had, by and large, internalized the constraints of their vincolo esterno 
during the 1990s. It was the good times that undid these commitments, both 
economically and institutionally; it was the bad times that really tested the 
politics of consent. It will not easily be rebuilt without a new European-level 
impetus. 
The periphery countries currently face a challenge of managing adjustment 
through piecemeal policy change in the hope that the painfully slow rate of 
growth will help offset the budgetary disciplines they have to implement. But the 
domains of national preference articulation and of EU priority-setting only 
partially intersect. Peter Mair made valuable contributions toward our 
understanding of this ungoverned space between democratic responsiveness 
and technocratic responsibility (Mair, 2013, 2014). Of course the EU policy-
makers are themselves accountable to their own national electorates. But the old 
specter of nationally-grounded power imbalances hovers over the EU decision-
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making framework. Greece discovered this at great cost through direct 
confrontation: indirectly, the German electoral cycle is frequently a key 
determinant of the timing of EU initiatives.  
Transnational governance of interdependence would suggest the need for a 
transnational arena of accountability for European policy-makers. Bruszt and 
Vukov (Introduction) make the case for moving toward a strengthened 
transnational democratic forum to support policy-making for a Europe-wide 
polity. However, innovations along these lines, similar to the progress made in 
boosting the powers of the European Parliament vis-à-vis the Commission in 
recent reforms, while undoubtedly important, do not address more fundamental 
problems.  
What would be the incentives for voters to engage seriously with a 
representation in a borderless polity that does not (yet) exist? European states ǣǲrooted 
configurations of power and identityǳ (Fabbrini, 2016: 279). Furthermore, we 
might here invert the slogan of the early American independence movement to 
suggest that there is no meaningful representation without taxation, and that 
there can be no possibility of increasing taxation without genuine contestation 
over how it is raised, on whom it is levied, and how the revenues are to be 
deployed. But European decision-making and policy administration systems 
were designed to be devoid of politics, that is, of contestation over competing 
policy objectives and over the methods and means of policy implementation. 
Greece tested this to the limit in 2015. But it was Greek resolve that was broken, 
and the integrity of the institutional elites that prevailed (Featherstone, 2016). 
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This, for many, was the ultimate proof of a ǲEurope entrappedǳ (Offe, 2014), 
fettered to a modern version of the Gold Standard. 
So while wǯ legitimacy in 
EU decision-making would be desirable, the key tension iǯs 
between the need to strengthen transnational governance capacities (and to 
resolve the tensions between the multiple, overlapping EU and EMU modes of 
governance), while also according serious weight to national democratic political 
capacity.  
ǲǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤThe European 
authorities anticipate that renewed growth will follow from domestic ǲstructural 
adjustmentǳ alongside strong fiscal disciplines. For the periphery though, the 
implications of liberalization, deregulation, and privatization all point in the 
same direction: continued high unemployment, ǲinternal devaluationǳǡ declining 
living standards. A
ǡǲfrom an economic point of view, flexibility 
is the solution; from a social and political point of view, flexibility is the problemǳ 
(de Grauwe 2015, p.101). And as Rodrik (2012) has noted, ǲǡǤǳ  
Without a clear pathway out of crisis, comparative experience clearly points 
toward mounting problems of maintaining sufficient consent to keep the policy 
commitment in place. Sustaining or renewing consent to the European project 
now appears to require, all the more urgently, visible and tangible success as its 
measure. If citizens of Eurozone member states cannot see a pathway out of 
crisis, a viable strategy for renewed growth, and a visible end to the years of 
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austerity and unemployment, ongoing democratic consent cannot be presumed 
indefinitely.  
There have been welcome if still limited recent initiatives in financial system ǡǲǳ
EMU-level risk-pooling, a European-wide benefits safety-net, and mechanisms 
that would strengthen both national fiscal capacity and European-level 
investment capabilities. All these would increase the European capacity for 
effective and well-coordinated policy response. But much more is required. At a 
minimum, this implies a rededication to the Delors-era ǲǳ. Many aspects of political capacity in key areas can and should be 
strengthened at European level. But this is no straightforward prescription in ǲǳǤ 
In conclusion, a broader theoretical framework, drawing on the comparative and ǲǳǡǡ
our current European situation, there is no necessary or linear connection 
between monetary union and political union simpliciter.  
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